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Marital Status and Earnings Management (A Note) 
 
Abstract 
 
In this note, we examine the effect of CEO marital status on the riskiness of financial 
reporting. Using multiple proxies, we find that firms headed by a single CEO display a 
higher degree of earnings management than those headed by a married CEO. The effect 
is economically significant. Our results persist in an instrumental variable regression, 
suggesting that our results are not driven by innate heterogeneity in preferences. 
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Marital Status and Earnings Management (A Note) 
 
1. Introduction 
Does the marital status of a corporation’s CEO affect its level of earnings 
management? Earlier literature has suggested that there are individual fixed effects on 
financial reporting (e.g., Bamber et al., 2010). Another stream of research has indicated 
that fixed characteristics, such as the CEO’s gender (Faccio et al., 2011), or 
environmental characteristics, such as religiosity (Hilary and Hui, 2009), have a 
moderating effect on corporate risk aversion. More recently, Roussanov and Savor 
(2014) have shown that a firm headed by a single CEO exhibits stock return volatility 
that is 3% higher and invests 10% more, on average. In this note, we extend their 
findings by considering whether the CEO’s marital status affects the riskiness of 
financial reporting.  
This could be true for several reasons. For example, married CEOs might focus 
more on job security and stability, which increases their induced risk aversion. Marriage 
could have a direct biological effect on preference. For example, Burnham et al. (2003) 
have found that married males have lower testosterone levels, which is positively 
correlated with risk-taking behavior (Jia, van Lent and Zeng, 2014). It could also be 
that married men have greater economic and social commitment when they are married, 
and they are less willing to take actions that could jeopardize the welfare of their 
families. To the extent that managers have significant discretion to change corporate 
policies to better suit their personal risk preferences, we expect married CEOs to be 
more conservative in their accounting policies. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find 
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that a firm headed by a single CEO experiences a degree of earnings management that 
is approximately 7% higher than the average. Our results persist when we instrument 
the CEO’s marital status based on variations in divorce laws across states, suggesting 
that our results are not driven by innate heterogeneity in preferences. 
Our research examines the ways in which a CEO’s marital status affects 
reporting outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, our note is the first to do so. In a 
recent study, Law and Mills (2016) indicate that “For employee selection, boards can 
consider employees’ personal characteristics as a control mechanism when outputs are 
difficult to contract ex ante or measure ex post.” Risk preference is an example of a 
construct that is difficult to contract on. More generally, our study examines how units 
of socialization, in part outside the work setting, affect financial outcomes. 
 
2. Data and Specifications 
We use the data on marital status provided by Roussanov and Savor (2014), who 
collected the names, biographical information, and compensation of all CEOs who were 
covered by ExecuComp during the period of 1993–2008.1 They also researched the 
marital and family statuses of CEOs by using a variety of public sources, including the 
Marquis Who’s Who in Finance and Industry, the Notable Names Database, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s insider filings, and various media mentions. 
We refer readers to their study for further details.2 We then merge this database with 
                                                             
1 Specifically, we use the dataset Roussanov and Savor made available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1926. We thank them for sharing their data. 
2  We have randomly selected 400 CEOs in our sample and manually searched for their marital 
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information from Compustat and the Center for Research in Security Prices. 
Next, we estimate the following model: 
Yi,t = α1 + β1 Singlei,t + δk Controlsi,t + φt YearsFEt + ψj Ind FEj + εi,t          (1) 
where i indexes firms, and t indexes years. Y represents discretionary accruals 
measures.3 As our main measure, we use discretionary accruals that are estimated from 
the Modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model, and consider alternative measures 
using the Modified Jones (1991) Model and the Kothari et al. (2005) Model, which are 
provided in the Online Appendix. Single takes the value of one if the CEO is coded as 
single in the Roussanov and Savor (2014) dataset, and zero otherwise.4 Controls are a 
vector of control variables that are known to affect earnings management practices 
based on prior literature (the definitions are provided in the Online Appendix). 
Roussanov and Savor (2014) show that firms headed by married CEOs display different 
investment and risk patterns. To mitigate the concerns that the accounting system 
reflects underlying differences in risk and investment, we explicitly control for those 
two variables in the regression: Investment and Volatility. Year FE and Ind FE are year 
                                                             
information. We were able to replicate 98.5% of their coding. Furthermore, we form a stratified sample 
comprised of the 100 CEOs for whom we have verified the marriage date and 17 randomly selected 
single CEOs (to match the proportion of single CEOs in our main sample). We re-estimate our baseline 
regression using these 117 CEOs. Our conclusions are not affected (See the Online Supplemental 
Material for details). 
3  Our analysis focuses on accruals earnings management because accruals management carries 
significant legal risk, but real earnings management does not. Therefore, we expect the effect of a CEO’s 
marital status to be concentrated in accruals management.  
4 Some married CEOs ultimately divorce (e.g. Jack Welch of GE), which may introduce measurement 
errors in the coding of marital status. We discuss and address the potential impact of measurement errors 
on our estimates in the Online Supplemental Material. Our tests suggest that such measurement errors 
are unlikely to affect our conclusions. 
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and industry fixed effects at the SIC 2-digit level, respectively.  
 
3. Descriptive Statistics 
We provide descriptive statistics in Table A1 of the Online Appendix. The 
untabulated values are consistent with the prior literature (e.g., Cohen, Dey and Lys, 
2008). We also provide univariate correlations in Table A2 of the Online Appendix. The 
results indicate that our three measures of earnings management are positively 
correlated, with a Spearman correlation ranging from 0.6 to 0.8. More importantly, 
Single is positively and significantly correlated with EM (the univariate correlations 
range from 0.05 to 0.07). The correlations among other variables are low, suggesting 
that multicollinearity is not an issue in our setting. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
The results of the estimation of model (1) are presented in Table 1. They indicate 
that Single is significantly (t-statistic = 2.43) and positively related to earnings 
management.5 The economic effect is such that hiring a single CEO increases the 
amount of earnings management by 6.7% of the average value of EM. The control 
variables usually have the predicted signs. We find that firms that exhibit a more 
conservative corporate culture (e.g., Hilary and Hui, 2009) or greater monitoring from 
                                                             
5  To mitigate the concern that the biological difference in testosterone between men and women, 
independent of their marital status, could drive our results (e.g., Jia, et al. (2014)), we perform two 
untabulated robustness tests: 1) we control for the CEO gender, 2) we exclude observations with female 
CEOs. Our conclusions are not affected. 
7 
 
debtholder and institutional investors (Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam, 2008; 
Bens et al., 2015) are less likely to engage in accruals earnings management. The results 
reported in Table A3 of the Online Appendix indicate that we obtain similar results 
(both statistically and economically) using the Kothari et al. (2005) Model, and 
qualitatively similar results using the Modified Jones (1991) Model. 6  Our results 
support the hypothesis that single CEOs are more willing to take risks in financial 
reporting than married CEOs. However, one concern is that our results may be driven 
by unobservable CEO characteristics that are correlated with marital status. To address 
this concern, we employ an instrumental variable approach that is identical to that of 
Roussanov and Savor (2014). Our instrument, Community, takes a value of one if a 
state has adopted the common property system, with which all assets acquired during 
the marriage are equally divided between the two spouses upon divorce, regardless of 
how much each spouse contributed, and zero otherwise. Because CEOs are typically 
wealthier than their spouses, equal division of assets is costlier for them. Upon the 
dissolution of a marriage, the judicial difference in property allocation affects perceived 
costs of marriage at the state level, and hence, the CEOs’ marital status; but this effect 
is unlikely to directly affect the quality of a firms’ financial reporting quality. In the first 
stage (reported in Table A6 of the Online Appendix), we find that Community has a 
significantly positive (t-statistic = 2.67) effect on the probability of a CEO being single, 
after controlling for firm and CEO characteristics, along with industry and year fixed 
effects. The first stage F-statistic is 40.5, suggesting that the instrument is not weak. 
                                                             
6 The t-statistic associated with Single is 1.51 when we use the Modified Jones (1991) Model. 
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The results of the second stage estimations continue to indicate a positive effect of CEO 
marital status on earnings management (using all three different proxies).7 Next, we 
examine the effect of the CEO’s marital status on subsequent fraud detection. RLA is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is a restatement, litigation or 
AAER, and zero otherwise. Column 3 reports results from a logistic regression, 
indicating that a single CEO is 18% more likely to engage in questionable reporting 
practice than a married one. Column 4 reports the second stage IV regression, using 
Community as the instrument for marital status. Our conclusions are unaffected. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We show that the CEO’s marital status has an effect on the riskiness of financial 
reporting. Using multiple proxies for earnings management, we find that firms headed 
by single CEOs display a degree of earnings management that is approximately 5% to 
10% higher than the average level. Our results are strengthened when we use an 
instrumental variable regression based on variations in divorce laws across U.S. states. 
The results support the hypothesis that the CEO’s marital status impacts a firm’s risk-
taking, rather than simply reflecting innate heterogeneity in CEO preferences. As noted 
in the introduction, we propose three channels that can plausibly explain our results.  
A possible direction for future research is to disentangle these three explanations. 
                                                             
7 We report the second stage regression for earnings management measure using the Modified Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) Model in Column 2 of Table 1 and the other two measures in Table A6 of the Online 
Appendix). 
9 
 
References 
 
Bamber, L. S., Jiang, J., Wang, I. 2010. What’s My Style? The Influence of Top 
Managers on Voluntary Corporate Financial Disclosure. The Accounting Review 85, 
1131-1162. 
 
Bens, D., Huang, S., Tan, L., Wonsunwai, W., 2015. Accounting and Contracting 
Choices around a Change in Fiduciary Duties. Available at SSRN: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2376476 
 
Bowen, R., Rajgopal, S., Venkatachalam, M., 2008. Accounting Discretion, Corporate 
Governance, and Firm Performance. Contemporary Accounting Research 25, 351-405. 
 
Burnham, T., Chapman, J., Gray, P., McIntyre M., Lipson, S., Ellison, P., 2003. Men in 
Committed, Romantic Relationships Have Lower Testosterone. Hormones Behavior 44, 
119-122.  
 
Cohen, D., Dey, A., Lys, T., 2008. Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management in 
the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes Oxley Periods, The Accounting Review 83, 757-787. 
Dechow, P., I. Dichev, 2002. The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of 
Accrual Estimation Errors. The Accounting Review 77, 35–59. 
 
Faccio, M., Marchica, M. T., Mura, R., 2011, CEO Gender and Corporate Risk-Taking, 
Working paper. 
 
Greene, W., 2003. Econometric Analysis 5th Edition. Prentice Hall.  
 
Hilary, G., Hui, K.W., 2009, Does Religion Matter in Corporate Decision Making in 
America? Journal of Financial Economics 93, 455-473. 
 
Jia, Y., Van Lent, L., Zeng, Y., 2014. Masculinity, Testosterone and Financial 
Misreporting. Journal of Accounting Research 52, 1195-1246. 
 
Jones, J., 1991, Earnings Management during Import Relief Investigations, Journal of 
Accounting Research 29, 193-228. 
 
Kothari, S.P., Leone, A., Wasley, C. 2005. Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual 
Measure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 163-197. 
 
Law, K. and L. Mills, 2016. Military Experience and Corporate Tax Avoidance, Review 
of Accounting Studies, forthcoming. 
 
Roberts. M., Whited, T., 2013. Endogeneity in Empirical Corporate Finance. Handbook 
10 
 
of the Economics of Finance Volume 2, Part A, Edited by George M. Constantinides, 
Milton Harris and Rene M. Stulz. 
 
Roussanov, N., Savor, P., 2014. Marriage and Managers' Attitudes to Risk. 
Management Science 60, 2496-2508. 
 
11 
 
Appendix A: Variable Definitions  
Variables  Definitions 
EM_DD Accrual-based earnings management measure using 
the Modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model. It is 
the absolute value of the residual from the following 
regression for each year and each Fama-French 48 
industry that has at least 20 observations: TAi,t = α0 + 
α1CFOi,t-1 + α2CFOi,t + α3CFOi,t+1 + α4∆Sales,t+ 
α5PPEi,t+εi,t 
EM_MJ Accrual-based earnings management using the 
Modified Jones (1991) Model. It is the absolute value 
of the residual from the following regression for each 
year and each Fama-French 48 industry that has at least 
20 observations: TAi,t = α0 + α1∆Revi,t+ α2PPEi,t+εi,t 
EM_KWL Accrual-based earnings management using the Kothari 
et al. (2005) Model. It is the absolute value of the 
residual from the following regression for each year 
and each Fama-French 48 industry that has at least 20 
observations: TAi,t = α0 + α1∆Revi,t+ α2PPEi,t+ α2ROAi,t 
+εi,t 
RLA An indicator variable takes the value of one if there is 
restatement, litigation or AAER in year t, and zero 
otherwise. 
Single  An indicator variable that takes the value of one if a 
CEO is not married, and zero otherwise.  
CEO ownership 
 
Percentage of outstanding shares of firm i that are 
owned by a CEO. 
CEO tenure CEO’s tenure.  
CEO age CEO’s age.  
Firm Size Log of market value of equity. 
MTB Market value (fiscal year end price times number of 
shares outstanding) divided by the book value of 
equity.  
Liti Risk An indicator variable that equals one if the firm 
operates in a high-litigation industry (SIC codes 2833-
2836; 3570-3577; 3600-3674; 5200-5961, and 7370-
7374), and zero otherwise. 
Leverage  Total debt divided by total assets  
Inst Ownership Percentage of shares held by institutional investors  
ROA  Earnings before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets  
NOA Net operation asset, which is defined as shareholders’ 
equity less cash and marketable securities, plus total debt, 
all deflated by sales. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions, Continued  
 
Loss An indicator variable that equals one if a firm reports a 
net loss for year t, and zero otherwise. 
Emp Growth  Change of employee in year t. 
SEC Distance Log of the shortest distance to SEC regional office. 
Religiosity Percentage of adherents at county-year level. 
Investment The sum of capital expenditures, net acquisitions, R&D 
expenditures and advertising expenditures, scaled by total 
assets in year t.  
Volatility  The annualized standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns over the previous year.  
Community  An indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm 
is headquartered in a community property state, and zero 
otherwise.  
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Table 1 Main Results 
The sample period is from 1993 to 2008. We exclude financial industries (SIC 6000-6999). All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. Constants are included, but not reported in the regressions. t-statistics are 
presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are two-way clustered 
at firm and year levels. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 EM_DD - OLS EM_DD - IV RLA- Logit RLA- IV 
         
Single 0.004** 0.071** 0.173* 1.010*** 
 (2.43) (2.05) (1.72) (3.98) 
CEO Ownership 0.001 0.001** 0.113*** 0.152*** 
 (1.27) (2.01) (3.79) (4.89) 
CEO Tenure -0.000 0.000 -0.029*** 0.002 
 (-1.02) (0.43) (-2.90) (0.11) 
CEO Age -0.000 0.000 -0.014** 0.015 
 (-0.97) (0.69) (-2.16) (1.45) 
Firm Size -0.000 0.003 -0.082* 0.311*** 
 (-0.09) (1.51) (-1.80) (2.82) 
MTB 0.002*** 0.001*** -0.005 -0.047** 
 (5.04) (3.59) (-0.37) (-2.46) 
Liti Risk 0.001 0.002 0.260 0.324* 
 (0.34) (0.67) (1.52) (1.88) 
Leverage -0.010* -0.003 0.482** 1.171*** 
 (-1.90) (-0.61) (2.50) (4.74) 
Inst Ownership -0.009*** -0.014*** 0.437* -0.329 
 (-2.94) (-3.69) (1.92) (-1.13) 
ROA -0.146*** -0.151*** -0.501 -1.016*** 
 (-7.28) (-7.45) (-1.39) (-2.60) 
NOA -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.042 -0.115 
 (-3.86) (-4.23) (-0.50) (-1.33) 
Loss 0.008** 0.010** 0.123 0.195** 
 (2.43) (2.57) (1.40) (2.16) 
Emp Growth 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.552*** 0.419*** 
 (5.99) (5.81) (3.97) (3.07) 
SEC Distance -0.000 -0.000 -0.055 -0.020 
 (-0.30) (-0.08) (-1.10) (-0.40) 
Religiosity -0.010* -0.009 0.068 0.490 
 (-1.73) (-1.37) (0.17) (1.18) 
Investment 0.026*** 0.027*** -0.458** -0.378* 
 (3.52) (3.83) (-2.07) (-1.69) 
Volatility 0.038*** 0.025*** 0.819*** 0.503** 
 (5.85) (3.58) (4.11) (2.40) 
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Table 1 Main Results, Continued 
 
Observations 12,674 12,674 12,452 12,452 
R-squared 0.209 0.208 0.118 0.121 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Introductory Remarks 
This Online Supplemental Material complements and extends the analysis 
carried out in “Marital Status and Earnings Management (A Note)” in several ways. 
First, it complements the paper by providing more descriptive statistics. Second, it 
extends the paper through a set of robustness tests to address various specification 
issues that could confound our results. 
 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table A1 provides the summary statistics of our sample. 17% of the sample is 
headed by unmarried CEOs. The average CEO tenure is 5.3 years with an average age 
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of 55 years old. The average institutional ownership is 67% and firms hold 17% of their 
assets in investment with an average return on assets of 5%. Table A2 reports pairwise 
correlation among variables and we do not have high correlations among different 
control variables, suggesting that multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue in our 
regression specification. 
 
2. Robustness Tests 
2.1 Alternative measure of earnings management 
Abnormal accruals measures have been widely used to study managers’ 
earnings management. We use the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals quality measure 
as our main earnings management proxy. In this section, we consider two alternative 
abnormal accruals measures that have been used in several prior studies. The first 
measure is discretionary accruals based on the Modified Jones (1991) model. 
Specifically, we estimate the following model by year for each Fama-French 48 
industry that has at least 20 observations 
TAi,t = α0 + α1∆Revi,t+ α2PPEi,t+εi,t       (A1) 
where TAi,t is total accruals of firm i at year t, measured as the change in non-cash 
current assets minus the change in current non-interest-bearing liabilities, minus 
depreciation and amortization expense, scaled by average total assets; ∆Revi,t is the 
annual change in revenues scaled by average total assets; PPEi,t is property, plant, and 
equipment for firm i at year t, scaled by average total assets. The absolute value of 
residuals from Equation (A1) represents the abnormal accruals that cannot be explained 
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by the change in revenues and the level of PPE. 
The second abnormal accruals measure is performance-adjusted discretionary 
accruals as developed by Kothari et al (2005). Specifically, we estimate the following 
model by year for each Fama-French 48 industry that has at least 20 observations: 
TAi,t = α0 + α1∆Revi,t+ α2PPEi,t+ α3ROAi,t+εi,t              (A2) 
where ROAi,t is the return on assets for firm i at year t and all the other variables are 
defined under equation A1. We define abnormal accruals as the absolute value of the 
residuals from the regression model.  
We re-estimate our baseline regression (i.e. Equation 1) using these two 
alternative measures. Table A3 shows that we obtain similar results (both statistically 
and economically) using the Kothari et al (2005) model and qualitatively similar results 
using the Modified Jones (1991) model.   
 
2.2. Measurement errors 
Our analyses rely on the correct coding of marital status from Roussanov and 
Savor (2014) CEO marital data. Indeed, measurement errors in the initial dataset may 
introduce a bias in our coefficient estimates. As discussed in Roussanov and Savor 
(2014), the direction of this bias is difficult to ascertain. On one hand, some CEOs who 
are divorced might be wrongly counted as married, making the effective timing of 
divorce difficult to identify. However, there is an offsetting bias. Some CEOs may be 
involved in common law marriages, and for our purpose, their status should be 
classified as married. In our setting, a wrongly characterized marital status for some 
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CEOs would not constitute a problem, as long as the effect was uncorrelated with the 
variables under examination. To gauge the extent of measurement error they might have 
in their initial dataset, Roussanov and Savor (2014) benchmark their descriptive 
statistics against the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances. They conclude that the marital 
statuses of CEOs is consistent with the patterns found in the general population. 
Nevertheless, we further address this concern by cross-checking marital status 
of 400 randomly selected CEOs from the sample. We hand collect additional marital 
information from a variety of public sources such as LexisNexis, Zoominfo.com, 
Marquis Who’s Who, Capital IQ and Notable Names Database. We follow the same 
coding procedures that were outlined in Roussanov and Savor (2014). In 394 cases (out 
of 400), our coding is consistent with Roussanov and Savor (2014). Thus, we are able 
to explicitly replicate 98.5% of their coding. We found a partial discrepancy only in one 
instance. Bill Gates was CEO of Microsoft from 1993 to 1999. He divorced his first 
wife in 1995 and remarried in 1996. We coded Gates as being single in these two years 
while he was coded as married in the initial dataset.8 For the remaining five cases, we 
were not able to identify the initial marriage date and did not find any information 
suggesting that these CEOs may have divorced during our sampling period.  
Next, we randomly selected 100 CEOs for whom we could verify the marriage 
year/date information. Out of those 100 observations, 10 experienced divorce at some 
                                                             
8 From a theoretical point of view, it is not obvious that we should consider CEOs who eventually 
divorce to be “single.” For example, if the reason for the lower risk appetite is a fixed characteristic (e.g., 
men with lower testosterone are more likely to marry), this should not be the case. Thus, the initial coding 
may be factually incorrect but more descriptive than the revised one.  
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point. 8 (out of those 10) individuals divorced before 1993 and were remarried by the 
time they were identified as CEOs in our sample. One divorced between 1993 and 2008 
but only after stepping down as CEO. The last one (Bill Gates) divorced and re-married 
during the period he was CEO. Panel A of Table A4 provides the list of 10 CEOs who 
experienced divorce. Panel B of Table A4 lists all the remaining 90 CEOs for whom we 
verify the marriage status and marriage year information.    
The proportion of single CEOs in our main sample described in Table A1 is 17%. 
We form a mimicking stratified sample comprised of the 100 CEOs for whom we have 
verified the marriage date and 17 randomly selected single CEOs. We verified that we 
do not find any evidence of marriage for these 17 CEOs (we provide the list of these 17 
individuals in Panel C of Table A4). We then re-estimate the baseline regression using 
this hand collected sample. The results, presented in Table A5, continue to show that 
unmarried CEOs are associated with a greater amount of earnings management across 
three different proxies of accruals management.  
Finally, and importantly, our use of instrumental variable specification 
described in the next section further mitigates a potential misclassification problem 
(Roberts and Whited, 2013; Greene, 2003). Overall, we do not anticipate measurement 
error to materially affect our conclusions. 
 
2.3. Instrument Variables Approach 
To mitigate the concern that our results may be driven by unobservable CEO 
characteristics that are correlated with marital status, we adopt the instrument variable 
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approach. Our instrument, Community, takes a value of one if a state has adopted the 
common property system. The instrument exploits variation in divorce laws across 
different states in the United States, which is very likely to be exogenous to the CEO–
firm match and to firms’ financial reporting choices. Our identifying assumption is that 
division of marital property upon the dissolution of marriage should influence an 
individual’s propensity to get married in the first place. We therefore distinguish 
between states where this division is determined by the community property system 
and those where it is determined by equitable distribution standard.  
In the first stage, we regress Single on the instrumental variable as well as all of the 
control variables. In the second stage, we then repeat the baseline regression (i.e., 
Equation 1) using a two-stage least squares approach, where we substitute the predicted 
marital status from the first stage regression for the endogenous variable Single. 
Table A6 reports our findings under instrument variable regression. Column 1 
reports the first stage estimation. We find that our instrument has a significantly positive 
effect on the probability of a CEO being single. The first stage F-statistic is 40.5, 
suggesting that our instrument is not weak. Column 2-5 reports the second stage 
regression and our conclusions remain unchanged.
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Table A1 Summary Statistics 
 
The sample period is from 1993 to 2008. We exclude financial industries (SIC 6000-6999). All the 
variables are defined in the Appendix A.  
 
  N Mean Median Std P25 P75 
EM_DD 12,674 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.07 
EM_MJ 12,674 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.08 
EM_KWL 12,674 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.07 
RLA 12,452 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.00 
Single 12,674 0.17 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 
CEO Ownership 12,674 9.58 9.63 1.79 8.52 10.72 
CEO Tenure 12,674 5.31 4.00 4.84 2.00 8.00 
CEO Age 12,674 54.60 55.00 7.50 49.00 60.00 
Firm Size 12,674 7.22 7.06 1.54 6.15 8.15 
MTB 12,674 3.25 2.42 3.24 1.61 3.87 
Liti Risk 12,674 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Leverage 12,674 0.49 0.50 0.21 0.34 0.63 
Inst Ownership 12,674 0.67 0.69 0.21 0.52 0.83 
ROA 12,674 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.10 
NOA 12,674 0.95 0.80 0.65 0.56 1.11 
Loss 12,674 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 
Emp Growth 12,674 0.09 0.04 0.24 -0.03 0.14 
SEC Distance 12,674 3.23 3.40 1.01 2.73 3.97 
Religiosity 12,674 0.54 0.55 0.12 0.44 0.63 
Investment 12,674 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.07 0.21 
Volatility  12,674 0.40 0.35 0.22 0.25 0.50 
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Table A2 Correlations 
The sample period is from 1993 to 2008. We exclude financial industries (SIC 6000-6999). All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] 
[1] Single -- 
                   
[2] EM_DD 0.07 -- 
                  
[3] EM_MJ 0.05 0.77 -- 
                 
[4] EM_KWL 0.06 0.55 0.63 -- 
                
[5] RLA 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 -- 
               
[6] CEO Ownership -0.14 -0.05 -0.06 0.03 0.02 --       
        
[7] CEO Tenure -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.28 --            
  
[8] CEO Age -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 0.16 0.17 --           
  
[9] Firm Size -0.16 -0.09 -0.12 -0.04 -0.01 0.55 0.08 0.04 --          
  
[10] MTB -0.02 0.07 0.06 0.19 0.00 0.32 -0.02 -0.07 0.36 --         
  
[11] Liti Risk 0.02 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.11 0.06 -0.02 -0.16 0.05 0.11 --        
  
[12] Leverage -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.11 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.12 -0.01 -0.23 --       
  
[13] Inst Ownership 0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 0.07 0.02 0.12 -0.04 0.18 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 --      
  
[14] ROA -0.05 -0.27 -0.25 -0.06 -0.06 0.32 0.04 0.06 0.30 0.21 -0.06 -0.19 0.11 --     
  
[15] NOA 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.13 -0.06 -0.08 0.07 0.05 -0.21 --    
  
[16] Loss 0.05 0.24 0.21 0.10 0.06 -0.28 -0.04 -0.08 -0.25 -0.12 0.08 0.09 -0.10 -0.69 0.14 --   
  
[17] Emp Growth 0.01 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.03 0.17 -0.02 -0.08 0.06 0.15 0.10 -0.11 -0.02 0.11 0.10 -0.11 --  
  
[18] SEC Distance 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.09 -0.07 0.00 0.04 -0.13 -0.04 0.00 -- 
  
[19] Religiosity -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.10 0.07 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.13 -- 
 
[20] Investment 0.03 0.18 0.17 0.23 0.00 0.07 -0.06 -0.11 0.01 0.16 0.19 -0.12 -0.04 -0.05 0.17 0.04 0.47 -0.01 -0.06 -- 
[21] Volatility  0.08 0.29 0.28 0.23 0.11 -0.14 -0.03 -0.15 -0.32 0.00 0.24 -0.12 -0.14 -0.32 0.02 0.33 0.06 0.02 -0.13 0.15 
 
 
23 
 
Table A3 Earnings Management 
The sample period is from 1993 to 2008. We exclude financial industries (SIC 6000-6999). All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. Constants are included, but not reported in the regressions. t-statistics are 
presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are two-way clustered 
at firm and year levels. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 EM_DD EM_MJ EM_KWL 
        
Single 0.004** 0.003 0.004*** 
 (2.43) (1.51) (2.65) 
CEO Ownership 0.001 0.001 0.001* 
 (1.27) (1.49) (1.81) 
CEO Tenure -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.02) (-1.44) (-1.17) 
CEO Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.97) (-0.76) (-1.34) 
Firm Size -0.000 -0.001* -0.001 
 (-0.09) (-1.76) (-1.05) 
MTB 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (5.04) (4.81) (5.91) 
Liti Risk 0.001 -0.001 0.012*** 
 (0.34) (-0.26) (4.26) 
Leverage -0.010* -0.003 -0.007* 
 (-1.90) (-0.56) (-1.69) 
Inst Ownership -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.012*** 
 (-2.94) (-2.60) (-3.37) 
ROA -0.146*** -0.147*** -0.007 
 (-7.28) (-6.64) (-0.47) 
NOA -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.009*** 
 (-3.86) (-6.14) (-6.57) 
Loss 0.008** 0.004 0.008*** 
 (2.43) (1.12) (3.24) 
Emp Growth 0.027*** 0.037*** 0.020*** 
 (5.98) (7.83) (4.41) 
SEC Distance -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.30) (-1.01) (-0.60) 
Religiosity -0.010* -0.009 -0.021*** 
 (-1.73) (-1.51) (-3.67) 
Investment  0.026*** 0.028*** 0.044*** 
 (3.52) (4.86) (7.32) 
Volatility  0.038*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 
 (5.89) (5.72) (6.77) 
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Table A3 Earnings Management, Continued 
    
Observations 12,674 12,674 12,674 
R-squared 0.209 0.185 0.186 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A4 List of CEO Marriage Information 
This table provides marital information of 117 randomly selected CEOs with their marriage year and marital status information. We follow Roussanov and Savor 
(2014) when coding marital status. Our sample period is from 1993 to 2008. Panel A presents the 10 CEOs who experienced divorce. Start Year (End Year) is either 
the first (last) year the executive is the CEO or the starting (ending) year of our sample.  Panel B presents the marriage year information for the remaining 90 
CEOs whose marriage year can be identified. Panel C lists 17 randomly-selected single CEOs for whom we verified the marital status. 
 
Panel A List of CEOs who experienced divorce  
Start Year End 
Year 
Gvkey Company Name First Name Middle Name Last Name  Marital Status=Single Last Marriage First Marriage First Divorce Second Marriage 
2001 2008 8762 PROCTER & GAMBLE CO A. G. Lafley 0 1973 1973 2008  
1993 2001 1663 ANHEUSER-BUSCH August A. Busch III 0 1977 1977 1969 1977 
1993 1993 1690 APPLE John  Sculley 0 1978 1960 1965 1978 
2000 2007 23943 PMC-SIERRA INC Robert L. Bailey 0 1982 1957 1968 1982 
1993 1999 5606 HEWLETT-PACKARD CO Lewis E. Platt 0 1983 1965 1981 1983 
2001 2008 2285 BOEING CO W. James McNerney, Jr. 0 1987   1987 
1993 1995 10499 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS Jerry R. Junkins 0 1987 1976  1987 
1993 2001 5047 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO John F. Welch, Jr. 0 1989 1959 1987 1989 
2006 2008 10466 TESORO CORP Bruce A. Smith 0 1990 1969 1987 1990 
1993 1999 12141 MICROSOFT CORP William H. Gates III Single=1 for 1995-1996; 
Single=0 for 1993-1994  
and 1997-1999 
1996  1994 1996 
 
Panel B List of CEOs with detailed marriage year information  
Start 
Year 
End 
Year 
Gvkey Company Name First Name Middle Name Last Name  Marital Status=Single Last Marriage  First Marriage First Divorce Second Marriage 
2000 2008 150699 CIMAREX ENERGY CO F. H. Merelli 0 1955 1955 
  
1993 1997 10093 STONE CONTAINER  Roger Warren Stone 0 1955 1955 
  
1993 1995 4087 DU PONT (E I) DE NEMOURS Edgar S. Woolard, Jr. 0 1956 1956 
  
1993 2000 8530 PFIZER INC William C. Steere, Jr. 0 1957 1957 
  
1993 2008 28930 MARRIOTT INTL INC John Willard Marriott, Jr. 0 1957 1957 
  
1993 2001 62599 LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC Henry Brewer Schacht 0 1960 1960 
  
1993 2005 4503 EXXON MOBIL CORP Lee R. Raymond 0 1960 1960 
  
1993 2002 1704 APPLIED MATERIALS INC James C. Morgan 0 1960 1960 
  
1993 2001 6266 JOHNSON & JOHNSON Ralph S. Larsen 0 1961 1961 
  
1993 2002 9465 SCHLUMBERGER LTD Dugald Euan Baird 0 1961 1961 
  
1993 2008 29028 COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP James D. Sinegal 0 1961 1961 
  
1993 2003 6502 KROGER CO Joseph A. Pichler 0 1962 1962 
  
1993 2003 11465 WHIRLPOOL CORP David R. Whitwam 0 1963 1963 
  
1993 1997 3022 CHRYSLER CORP Robert J. Eaton 0 1964 1964 
  
1996 2007 11456 WEYERHAEUSER CO Steven R. Rogel 0 1964 1964 
  
1998 2006 1722 ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND CO G. Allen Andreas 0 1964 1964 
  
1993 2007 3170 COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO Reuben 
 
Mark 0 1964 1964 
  
1995 2004 7017 MARATHON OIL CORP Thomas J. Usher 0 1965 1965 
  
1996 2002 9459 SCHERING-PLOUGH Richard Jay Kogan 0 1965 1965 
  
1996 2000 9563 SEARS ROEBUCK & CO Arthur C. Martinez 0 1966 1966 
  
1993 2008 2255 BLACK & DECKER CORP Nolan D. Archibald 0 1967 1967 
  
1993 2005 3980 DISNEY (WALT) CO Michael D. Eisner 0 1967 1967 
  
1993 2002 7985 NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP Kent 
 
Kresa 0 1967 1967 
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1993 2006 2751 CARDINAL HEALTH INC Robert D. Walter 0 1967 1967 
  
2004 2008 9155 RITE AID CORP Mary F. Sammons 0 1967 1967 
  
1993 2008 11300 GRAHAM HOLDINGS CO Donald E. Graham 0 1967 1967 
  
1995 2005 5860 ITT Travis 
 
Engen 0 1967 1967 
  
2001 2003 15133 APOGENT TECHNOLOGIES INC Frank H. Jellinek, Jr. 0 1968 1968 
  
1993 2001 6066 INTL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP Louis V. Gerstner, Jr. 0 1968 1968 
  
2002 2008 10190 SUPERVALU INC Jeffrey 
 
Noddle 0 1968 1968 
  
1999 2008 6136 INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COS Michael I. Roth 0 1968 1968 
  
1999 2008 8549 CONOCOPHILLIPS James J. Mulva 0 1969 1969 
  
2002 2008 6066 INTL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP Samuel J. Palmisano 0 1969 1969 
  
2005 2008 7154 MCDONALD'S CORP James A. Skinner 0 1969 1969 
  
1997 2008 9459 SCHERING-PLOUGH Fred 
 
Hassan 0 1969 1969 
  
1998 2008 4087 DU PONT (E I) DE NEMOURS Charles O. Holliday, Jr. 0 1970 1970 
  
2002 2008 6266 JOHNSON & JOHNSON William C. Weldon 0 1970 1970 
  
1993 2001 10576 TIME WARNER INC-OLD Gerald M. Levin 0 1970 1970 
  
1999 2001 4839 FORD MOTOR CO Jacques A. Nasser 0 1970 1970 
  
2007 2008 4839 FORD MOTOR CO Alan R. Mulally 0 1970 1970 
  
2000 2008 2991 CHEVRON CORP David J. O'Reilly 0 1970 1970 
  
2001 2006 7881 NEWMONT MINING CORP Wayne W. Murdy 0 1970 1970 
  
1993 2002 6435 KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP Wayne R. Sanders 0 1970 1970 
  
2003 2008 7985 NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP Ronald D. Sugar 0 1971 1971 
  
2006 2008 142953 MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL INC Irene B. Rosenfeld 0 1971 1971 
  
2000 2008 29173 NEWFIELD EXPLORATION CO David A. Trice 0 1971 1971 
  
1993 2001 7228 MEDTRONIC PLC William W. George 0 1972 1972 
  
2001 2006 8479 PEPSICO INC Steven S. Reinemund 0 1974 1974   
2006 2008 5878 ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS David Blakeney Speer 0 1974 1974   
1999 2008 5568 HEINZ (H J) CORP II William R. Johnson 0 1974 1974   
1994 2008 12395 TOLL BROTHERS INC Robert I. Toll 0 1975 1975   
2002 2006 4839 FORD MOTOR CO William Clay Ford, Jr. 0 1975 1975   
2003 2008 5234 GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO Robert J. Keegan 0 1975 1975   
1993 1999 10156 SUNOCO INC Robert H. Campbell 0 1976 1976   
1998 2005 22532 SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO INC Jerry C. Moyes 0 1976 1976   
2008 2008 6730 LILLY (ELI) & CO John C. Lechleiter 0 1976 1976   
2002 2008 11636 XEROX CORP Anne M. Mulcahy 0 1976 1976   
2005 2008 6774 LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP Robert J. Stevens 0 1977 1977   
1998 2007 6730 LILLY (ELI) & CO Sidney  Taurel 0 1977 1977   
1996 2007 5020 GENENTECH  Arthur D. Levinson 0 1978 1978   
2002 2008 12171 TECH DATA CORP Robert M. Dutkowsky 0 1978 1978   
1995 2007 16721 ELECTRONIC ARTS INC Lawrence F. Probst III 0 1978 1978   
1997 2003 7585 MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS INC Christopher B. Galvin 0 1979 1979   
2007 2008 8479 PEPSICO INC Indra K. Nooyi 0 1980 1980   
2007 2008 8530 PFIZER INC Jeffrey B. Kindler 0 1980 1980   
1997 2008 160329 GOOGLE INC Eric E. Schmidt 0 1980 1980   
2007 2008 11264 WALGREENS BOOTS ALLIANCE INC Jeffrey A. Rein 0 1980 1980   
1994 2008 8133 OMNICARE INC Joel F. Gemunder 0 1980 1980   
1998 2007 114524 EBAY INC Margaret C. Whitman 0 1980 1980   
1993 1998 9545 SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY-OLD Alan F. Shugart 0 1981 1981   
2005 2008 27786 CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORP Aubrey K. McClendon 0 1981 1981   
1995 2008 3813 TARGET CORP Robert J. Ulrich 0 1981 1981   
2001 2008 7171 MCKESSON CORP John H. Hammergren 0 1981 1981   
1998 2008 7241 CVS HEALTH CORP Thomas M. Ryan 0 1984 1984   
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1995 2008 1380 HESS CORP John B. Hess 0 1984 1984   
1993 2008 11446 MEADWESTVACO CORP John A. Luke, Jr. 0 1984 1984   
1998 2004 6008 INTEL CORP Craig R. Barrett 0 1985 1985   
2000 2004 5606 HEWLETT-PACKARD CO Carleton S. Fiorina 0 1985 1985   
2002 2008 5047 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO Jeffrey R. Immelt 0 1986 1986   
1997 2008 8253 PACCAR INC Mark C. Pigott 0 1986 1986   
1993 2001 11636 XEROX CORP Paul A. Allaire 0 1988 1988   
1993 2005 13204 FISHER SCIENTIFIC Paul M. Montrone 0 1988 1988   
1994 1998 7254 MERCANTILE STORES CO INC David L. Nichols 0 1990 1990   
2000 2008 12141 MICROSOFT CORP Steven A. Ballmer 0 1990 1990   
2004 2005 12756 COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES INC John R. Alm 0 1990 1990   
2000 2006 10793 TYSON FOODS INC  -CL A John  Tyson 0 1990 1990   
1998 2008 1690 APPLE INC Steven P. Jobs 0 1991 1991   
2003 2008 9465 SCHLUMBERGER LTD Andrew  Gould 0 1991 1991   
2000 2008 1920 AVON PRODUCTS Andrea  Jung 0 1991 1991   
1993 2008 6733 L BRANDS INC Leslie H. Wexner 0 1993 1993   
 
Panel C List of randomly-selected single CEOs 
Start 
Year 
End 
Year 
Gvkey Company Name First Name Middle Name Last Name  Marital Status=Single Last Marriage  First Marriage First Divorce Second Marriage 
1996 2008 6109 INTERNATIONAL RECTIFIER Alexander  Lidow 1     
2003 2008 6081 NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL CORP Daniel C. Ustian 1     
2003 2008 9258 AXON EP Daniel F. McNease 1     
2001 2008 1327 SKYWORKS SOLUTIONS INC David J. Aldrich      
2000 2005 9699 SIGMA-ALDRICH David R. Harvey 1     
2002 2008 1678 APACHE CORP G. Steven Farris 1     
2005 2008 118795 QUICKSILVER RESOURCES Glenn  Darden 1     
2006 2008 124358 INTERNAP NETWORK SVCS CORP James P. DeBlasio 1     
2003 2008 13440 LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS INC James Q. Crowe 1     
2004 2008 148870 ADVANCED MEDICAL OPTICS James V. Mazzo 1     
2003 2008 3157 COHERENT INC John R. Ambroseo 1     
1995 2002 6081 NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL CORP John R. Horne 1     
2002 2008 24197 IDEXX LABS INC Jonathan Wight Ayers 1     
2000 2007 23943 PMC-SIERRA INC Robert L. Bailey 1     
2004 2008 2086 BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC Robert L. Parkinson, Jr 1     
1993 2008 2150 BELO CORP  -SER A COM Robert William Decherd 1     
2005 2008 126554 AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES INC William P. Sullivan 1     
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Table A5 Earnings Management-Hand Collected Sample  
The sample period is from 1993 to 2008. We exclude financial industries (SIC 6000-6999). We re-
estimate the baseline regression using firm-year observations, where 117 CEOs’ marriage year 
information can be identified from Table A4. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Constants are 
included, but not reported in the regressions. T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors 
are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are two-way clustered at firm and year levels. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
EM_DD EM_MJ EM_KWL 
     
Single 0.044** 0.020* 0.034* 
 
(2.393) (1.900) (1.831) 
CEO Ownership 0.003 0.001 0.004 
 
(1.411) (0.507) (1.273) 
CEO Tenure 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.014) (-0.581) (-0.652) 
CEO Age -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
(-0.629) (-0.150) (0.312) 
Firm Size 0.001 -0.000 0.002 
 
(0.223) (-0.164) (0.614) 
MTB -0.000 0.001* -0.001 
 
(-0.073) (1.693) (-0.380) 
Liti Risk -0.011 -0.001 -0.003 
 
(-0.806) (-0.096) (-0.193) 
Leverage 0.017 0.017 0.002 
 
(0.656) (1.209) (0.073) 
Inst Ownership -0.022 -0.007 -0.031 
 
(-0.974) (-0.379) (-1.340) 
ROA -0.143 -0.176*** 0.084 
 
(-1.530) (-2.908) (0.907) 
NOA -0.015** -0.014*** -0.013** 
 
(-2.072) (-2.991) (-2.150) 
Loss 0.025** 0.033*** 0.024* 
 
(2.115) (3.504) (1.881) 
Emp Growth 0.027 0.010 0.044** 
 
(1.170) (0.670) (2.151) 
SEC Distance -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
 
(-0.468) (-0.535) (-0.969) 
Religiosity -0.030 -0.048*** -0.003 
 
(-1.435) (-2.579) (-0.103) 
Investment 0.065* 0.059* 0.054 
 
(1.935) (1.920) (1.468) 
Volatility 0.023 0.014 0.050** 
 
(0.853) (0.700) (2.261) 
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Observations 745 745 745 
R-squared 0.396 0.392 0.420 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A6 Instrumental Variable Regressions 
The sample period is from 1993 to 2008. We exclude financial industries (SIC 6000-6999). Our 
instrument, Community, takes a value of one if a state has adopted common property law; zero otherwise. 
Pred Single is the predicted value of marital status from the first stage. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix A. Constants are included, but not reported in the regressions. t-statistics are presented beneath 
the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are two-way clustered at firm and 
year levels. 
 First stage Second stage  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Single EM_DD EM_MJ EM_KWL RLA 
           
Community 0.050***     
 (2.67)     
Pred Single  0.071** 0.063** 0.131*** 1.010*** 
  (2.05) (2.02) (4.11) (3.98) 
CEO Ownership -0.007 0.001** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.152*** 
 (-1.48) (2.01) (2.04) (3.42) (4.89) 
CEO Tenure -0.005* 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.002 
 (-1.87) (0.43) (0.09) (1.84) (0.11) 
CEO Age -0.003*** 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.015 
 (-3.58) (0.69) (0.82) (2.11) (1.45) 
Firm Size -0.044*** 0.003 0.001 0.005*** 0.311*** 
 (-7.75) (1.52) (0.82) (2.88) (2.82) 
MTB 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** -0.047** 
 (3.07) (3.59) (3.09) (3.73) (-2.46) 
Liti Risk -0.011 0.002 -0.001 0.012*** 0.324* 
 (-0.39) (0.67) (-0.16) (4.51) (1.88) 
Leverage -0.096** -0.003 0.004 0.006 1.171*** 
 (-2.46) (-0.61) (0.68) (1.17) (4.74) 
Inst Ownership 0.078** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.022*** -0.329 
 (2.32) (-3.69) (-3.10) (-5.39) (-1.13) 
ROA 0.051 -0.151*** -0.149*** -0.013 -1.016*** 
 (0.66) (-7.45) (-6.81) (-0.84) (-2.60) 
NOA 0.008 -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.115 
 (0.62) (-4.23) (-6.14) (-7.26) (-1.33) 
Loss -0.008 0.010** 0.005 0.009*** 0.195** 
 (-0.54) (2.57) (1.22) (3.61) (2.16) 
Emp Growth 0.013 0.027*** 0.036*** 0.018*** 0.419*** 
 (0.76) (5.81) (7.77) (4.08) (3.07) 
SEC Distance -0.004 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.020 
 (-0.48) (-0.08) (-0.73) (-0.12) (-0.40) 
Religiosity 0.028 -0.009 -0.006 -0.016*** 0.490 
 (0.46) (-1.37) (-1.06) (-2.76) (1.18) 
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Table A6 Instrumental Variable Regressions, Continued  
 
Investment  -0.015 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.046*** -0.378* 
 (-0.44) (3.83) (5.09) (7.71) (-1.69) 
Volatility  0.041 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.026*** 0.503** 
 (1.36) (3.58) (4.99) (5.32) (2.40) 
      
Observations 12,674 12,674 12,674 12,674 12,452 
R-squared 0.093 0.208 0.185 0.188 0.121 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
